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Article 17

Ethics and Medicine
Arthur J. Dyck

t of the human subject is absolutely essential. Th•

!:::n:o::::atZ~ ~:::: involvedb~:~:·:x~:;i:e•e::! ~~:;:t:/;h!~::. c;~~~;~

should be so situated as to be a
eit duress over-reachan~
the intenention of any element o~ t:torce, fraudio' n~eca nd' should' have sufficiel
•
,
· t: m of constraan or coerc
or other u Itenor or h
.
f the elements of the subject matter involve
knowledge and compre ens•on o d t ding and enlightened decision. Th
as to enable him to make an un ers a n
tance of a n affirmative decisio
latter element requires t~at before ~he ~c';:p made known to him the naturr
by the experimental subject there s. ou , e methods and means by wh ir
duration, and purpose of t~e experl.ment, th~ hazards reasonably to be e ..
it is to be conducted; all mconvemences a n
h' h may possibly con
.
pected; and the effects upon his ~ealth of person w •c
from his participation in the expenment.
.
1
Articles of the Nuremberg Tnbunal

patient and prevent har~. . lese
concerns have arisen wtthtr the
medical profession itself, but hey
are shared by the public at rge.
Technological
advances that
make it possible to transplat organs and keep the ~ea~t and Jngs
going when the bra t~ . ts no 1. nger
functioning, the abthty to liagnose genetic defects _whil.' the
developing child is sttll_ 11 the
·
t at ton with't
womb, the expenmen
The author is the Mary B. Salton- techniques that would ma e . I
possible to grow babies o tsJde
stall Professor of Population Ethi~s
the womb, the rising cost• and
at th e Harvard School of PubliC
complexity of delivering .tealth
Health and is a member of the
care with its adverse effet ,s on
Linacre Editorial Advisory Boa~d.
. t e n~.:·e of
the poor, and t he exts
In his essay, he seeks "some cla~lty
th e way in which ethical medical experiments that ar~ of
d'
a bou1
no immediate benefit to pJtlent~
questions arise within me ICa1
who a re subjects, are all fads o
practice" and suggests " a fr~me.~
modern li fe known and re!lected
work for formulating mo ral policy.

T he declarations of Nuremberg symbolize and express two
significant characteristics of th_e
contemporary situation of . medicine: a heightened responstveness
to the needs, wants and rights of
patients; a heightened a wareness
of the increasing difficulty of knowing what is . right, and hence of
knowing how best to benefit the
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upon not only by physicians but
also by the public, and by the
media that conveys so much of
this information -to the public.
The past decade has given rise
to a flurry of literature that documents and agonizes over moral
dilemmas within contemporary medicine. Some of this ·literature is designed to shock and alarm us. T hus,
for example, Pappworth writes a
book entitled Human Guinea Pigs
in which a number of cases are
cited as clear deviations from the
morality of traditional medical
practice.2 Within the profession,
Henry Beecher, in a widely read
essay, discussed cases that he judged
to be violations of existing medical codes, and hence unethical. 3
One cause for alarm, then, among
those · who are reflecting upo n contemporary medical practice arises
from perceived departures from
traditional values, including those
already embodied in medical codes.
Quite another kind of a larm is
being expressed, this by people
who tend to assume that technological innovations in medicine
and medical science are generally
good and ought to be vigorously
pursued. Such writers express the
concern that traditional values often the focu s is on religious values - continue to stand in the
way of medical innovation and
progress.• Whereas people used
to oppose surgery, blood transfusions, innoculations, etc., now
they oppose new definitions of
death, transplants, in-vitro fertili zation, etc. Some of these writers,
therefore, are inclined to call for
nothing less than a new ethic that
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will clarify the benefits of medical innovation and the necessity
of assuming various risks in order
to get these benefits. s

Decision-Making
Sharp differences of opinion
evoke still another kind of reaction to the morally problematic
character of contemporary medical decision-making. We see this,
for example, in the area of employing a technique like amniocentesis.s To justify the risks of this
diagnostic technique to discover
whether the child developing in
the womb has certain defects,
physicians often leave the decisio n
in the hands of the pregnant woman. She is the one who will decide
whether she will have an abortion
should her developing child be
diagnosed as defective. This approach to medical decision-making
is one of individualizing those decisions because individuals differ
as to whether or when abortion
for defective fetuses is morally
justifiable.
Sharply contrasting with the
tendency to individualize medical decisions is a call for much
more stringent regulation of the
medical profession, whether by
the legislatures, government agencies, and/or the courts. 7 T he desire for more stringent regulation
comes from those who wish to see
time-honored fo rmulations of moral values enforced. It comes also
from those who want to see new
values enshrined in medicine: some
physicians, for example, seek to
have euthanasia, mercy killing,
legalized.
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debates concerning contempc y
Whatever their merit, these re.h
medical practices. Indeed, we
sponses to contemporary moral
to indicate how these three t !S
dilemmas in medicine are inadere
quate . They are made without exth
plicitly offering the framework for
nunderstanding the relationship beat
tween ethical standards and medical practice implied by the policies
they advocate. The purpose of this
essay is to seek some clarity about
the way in which ethical questions
In her fascinating study of
arise within medical practice and
more universally and gener,ally
to suggest a framework for formuhuman values, Tamara De bo
lating moral policy. Obviously this
found that health was high 01 he
brief essay will only make a beginlist.9 Indeed, one of the el cts
ning of this dual enterprise.
of improvements in medicine tas
In characterizing the nature and
been to increase the expecta lOS
scope of ethics, it is possible to
both physicians . and the p ,(ic
outline the concerns of this dishave regarding the possibilit of
cipline by specifying its three
achieving health and mainta ing
major questions. The major quesit. The most startling achiever. nts
tions of ethics are normative, metaof medicine, and particular! of
ethical, and strategic.s Normative
public health measures, has · •me
questions are raised in an effort
in the form of greatly rec ced
to discover the most generally and
death rates from infectious and
universally recognizable
values
communicable diseases. The dethat specify the right- and wrongcreases in infant mortality th; remaking characteristics of actions,
sult greatly raise the prospel ; of
and the goodness and badness of
persons and various states of be- longevity.
With longevity, however, ome
ing. Questions of metaethics have
increases in diseases that ffect
as their concern the understandaging adults, such as cance1 and
ing of the nature of moral discourse
heart disease, diseases which may
and the processes by which moral also be related to our contl npojudgments and debates are decided,
rary style of life. It is pn . iseiY
argued, and justified or criticized. the increased ability to pr-1Jong
Questions of strategy are focused
life that poses what appears to be
upon the way in which moral de- the most fundamental quest1 m of
cisions are implemented and social values for the practitioner~ and
policy is fo~mulated and carried recipients of modern medical care.
out. What we wish to do in this Someone dying from cancer, for
essay is use these three types of example, can be kept alive much
questions, that serve to define the longer than ever before. Even panature and scope of ethics, to clar- tients whose brains are not runeify the nature and scope of ethical
Linacre QuarterlY
184

tioning can be fed and have their
~earts and lungs ma intained, somettmes for periods of more than two
years. Also at the beginning of life,
where the ability to perform abortions is coupled with an increasing ability to diagnose various types
of fetal deformities, questions
~bout the support of nascent life
10 the womb also arise. Situations
therefore,_ ~xist within contempo~
rary medJcme where the increased
expectation for health is not always compatible with the very
strong destre for maintaining life
as long as possible. For as we have
noted, there are circumsta nces
u~der which it is possible to sus~~~ bodily functions under condthons of extremely poor heal th.
At the same time, it is possible
~o choose to ha've only healthy
mfants.
B~t should health and a certain
quahty of life be considered a
more important value than life itself? Or to put the question another_ way, is quality of life _ a
ce~tam state of health and well~~~g- the dominant value by
htch we should judge what to
do as physicians and what we wish
as patients or should life itself be
the dominant value? This it seems
to me poses one of the most criti~~1 and far-reaching issues in the
tstory of ethics and medicine.
~ r~ther startlingly candid edi. Medicine comtonal m Cal;r.
t;orma
pares two ethical systems with
r~gard to their understanding of
t e value of life .'" One is the
Judeo-Christian ethic. This ethic
50 a
the ed 1't ona
· 1 claJms,
•
sees life'
as n absolute value and causes
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~hysicians to prolong a nd repai r
lt fe regardless of the cost and cir~umstances.
Alternatively, there
IS a new ethic that rejects the JudeoChristian formulation of absolute
devotion to life. In the view of
the editorial, the adoption of this
~ew ethic is beginning in the pract~ce of abortion where quality of
ltfe arguments are used to give
t~e moral justification for abortiOns, and will extend to various
forms of euthanasia. The editorial
does not give us a very clear indication as to the range of cases
in which ~illing could be j ustified by th1s new quality of life
ethic.

Stoicism
This editorial exhibits a very
pe netrating grasp of one of the
most significant moral d ebates in
~ onte mpora ry medicine. However,
It has oversimplified the alterna~iv~s considerably. For one thing,
It IS not true as the editorial a lleges, that the quality of life ethic
wou_ld _ b~ a new ethic. Ironically,
C h~1st1a ntty had its beginning at
a tn~e ~~en the high value it put
?n tnd1v1dual life distinguished
It sharply from other more do minant religious and ethical systems.
One s~c.h powerful phi losophy
:-v~s St01c1sm. The Stoic could defmJtely justify suicide in circumstanc~s where a person no longer
felt ltfe to be worth while. For the
Stoic, the freedom to exercise rational control over one's own destiny . was such a weighty value
that It always provided an option
to the continuation of one's own
life. ' '
Christianity also found itself
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in opposition to the widespread each individual has a right. At 1e
practices of infanticide and abor- same time, however, this right ty
tion that prevailed at the time of be forfeited by those individ Js
its inception. Where Christianity who threaten or rob others of
came to dominate, infanticide and their right to life. The value pl. ~d
is
abortion came to be seen as evils. upon life is so weighty .that
Laws to curb such evils came to not at all easy to justify ca .al
be enacted.l2 The editorial claims punishment and war. These tr lithat this legacy of Judaism and tions have especially strong ·nChristianity is waning, and an out- straints against killing any i olook, which as we have noted is cent party, that is, any indivt ml
more akin to traditional Stoicism, who could in no sense be tnis beginning to take its place. There strued as being an in,tentl 1al
is no clear evidence to support this threat or danger to the life of 1yone else. Hence the prohib on
assessment of trends.
It's unfair to contrast the Judea- against infanticide did take ar lbChristian ethic with the new ethic solute form.
A quality of life ethic doe• aot
by arguing that the former is abtreat
life as a good in itself. ife
solutistic and the latter relativistic.
as
a
value
is always life of a ·erThis obscures the issue of the diftain
kind
and
the right to I! · is
ference between an ethic in which
always
subject
to
question : it anlife itself is a significant value, and
an ethic in which questions of life not be assumed.
To see how this ethic func ms,
and death are always questions of
consider
the following cas, of
the quality of life, so that quality
a
Mongoloid
(Downs Syndr me)
of life and not life itself is the
child
who
was
deliberately
all wed
value to be weighed in relation
to
die.t4
Soon
after
birth
it was
to other values.
discovered
that
a
child,
diag
Jsed
Judaism and Christianity have
required
su
.
,ery.
as
Mongoloid,
never, except for certain of their
sects which espouse absolute paci- T his surgery does involve ome
fism, taken the view that it is never risks but is usually successfu and
morally justifiable to ki II. Capital permits a child to realize its i 1ysipunishment and self-defense have cal potential. Obviously it does
always had their defendants within nothing for whatever degr• ~ of
these traditions. The just war tradi- mental retardation the child 1 ould
tion has developed a whole set of experience as a Mongoloid Alsophisticated criteria designed to though mentally retarded, M, ngolconstrain rulers and armed forces oids are usually happy inJividfrom killing, but which at the uals and may sometimes n:•mage
same time state the conditions un- a degree of independence that inder which a war · waged in self- cludes earning one's own living
defense may be just. 13 In these and setting up an indepl!ndent
traditions, therefore, life is looked household. In this particular case,
upon as a good in itself to which the parents did not give pcrmis-
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sion for surgery and their physician acceded to the parents' wishes.
He ordered nothing by mouth and
fifteen days later the infant was
dead.
What kind of argument led the
participants to justify infanticide?
On the side of the parents there
was a strong desire to have a normal child, coupled with a very negative view of mental retardation on
the part of the mother who had had
some exposure to · such children.
Both parents did not want the suffering and anguish either of trying to rear such a child or of institutionalizing it. Presumably they
also did not wish a life of mental
retardation for their child. Whatever other assumptions were made
by their physician, there was a
strong feeling that institutionalization of an undesirable quality was
the only prospect for this child
and, given the attitudes of the parents, this was seen quite literally
as a fate worse than death. (As it
turned out, it was learned later
that there are couples in that area
who would gladly adopt mentally
retarded children. This fact, however, is not essential to understanding quality of life arguments.)
Quality of Life
. The essential feature of all qual·~. of life arguments is the propoSllton that there is such a thing
~ a life not worth living. Life
'!SCif is not what is good: only
hfe of a certain kind, life with a
ce~in degree of intelligence, potenttal for development, or whatever, !s considered valuable. Those
W~o argue in this way will disagree
With respect to what it is that

August, 197 3

gives life value, how much of it
one has to possess in order to have
a right to . life, and who it is that
has the authority to specify that
certain individuals will not, for
whatever reason, be granted a
right to life. Some would restrict
the decision as to what qualities
bestow value upon life to the individual whose life it is. This view
is very hard to maintain, however,
because it cannot apply to the very
young, the senile, the severely mentally ill or those who have lost their
capacity for conscious life. If mercy
killing is to be applied in such
instances, it cannot be considered
voluntary at the time in which people find themselves to be in one
of those conditions.ts
Someone may argue that there
is really no alternative to a quality
of life view. There are occasions
when it seems necessary to sacrifice life. One could cite here the
declaration of one highly revered
patriot when he exclaims "Give
me liberty or give me death! " However, this affirmation need not be
made from the standpoint of a quality of life ethic. One can take the
view that life is a significant good
in itself to which every individual
has a right and, at the same time,
claim that there are other values
of great significance to which individuals have a right, such as liberty and justice.
There are situations in which
the deprivation of liberty or the
perpetuation of injustices are so
severe that one might well morally justify risk to one's life and
limb in order to increase liberty
·or decrease injustice. In a situa-
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any system of justice. Rather th e
tion of enslave ment, for example,
rights have to be earned in sc e
there may be a point at which the
sacrifice of some lives may bring · way.
Ethical or political systems t .t
about the kind of freedom and jusentertain a merit view of jus e
tice that will greatly reduce sufferare at fundamental odds. with e
ing and death among the enslaved.
principle of equity. In John Ra· s'
Civil disobedience, rebellion, or
recent monumental work on just e,
even revolution may, under certain
he recognizes that certain kind! Jf
circumstances, satisfy the criteria
inequities, for example differer ..!S
involved for waging a just war.
in income, may be justifiable Jt
Using the just war criteria, the reonly if all persons, including t' se
spect for life is never lost. One
with less income, stand to bene •s
can never kill in order to improve
From the standpoint of those .10
one's material welfare or happiness.
see life as a good in itself, li is
But one may wage war to rectify
one of those benefits . From he
grave injustices and overcome opstandpoint of certain qualit; of
pression. The injustices and oplife arguments, however, life mpression of slavery can be so great
der certain circumstances is wt
that those who are slaves experience a great deal of premature considered a benefit.
Utilitarian
death, whether as infants or adults
This brings us to another imdeprived of proper care, or as
portant normative question. \lot
young people or adults so poorly
only does one's system of ~ 1ics
fed and worked so hard that the
hinge on the particular value uch
usual chances for a normal life
as life, liberty, and justice afexpectancy are severely reduced .
firmed by it, but also on the ode
The right to life, therefore, is
of moral reasoning employed :::>ne
fundamentally linked to maintaincommon method of moral rl >oning and respecting rights to liberty
ing is what is called in ethic utiland justice. In the case of the Monitarian. A system of ethics th: emgoloid child, the complete deprivaploys only utilitarian reason g is
tion of liberty - the child is not
one in which the rightnes and
allowed to grow up and decide for
wrongness of actions, and the .ooditself whether life is worth living
ness of persons and of social ~nds,
- means in that case the complete
are all judged by some stand rd of
loss of the right to live. Similarly,
utility. The rights of individt lis to
where abnormalities such as menlife, libe rty, and justice at not
tal retardation are used to decide
presumed. Such rights must >e esthe merit of a life, a merit view
tablished by their utility.
of justice is brought into play.
One of the narrower fo1ms of
The merit vi'ew of justice does not
contemporary utilitaria n t•.:asonpresume that each individual has
ing is that of judging poliltcs by
an equal right to life, liberty, and
computing their cost effect iveness.
the goods of this world, including
If the uti! ity of a project l: xcecds
due process, the cornerstone of
Lin ac n: ()u art..:rlY
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its di_sutility, it can be justified.
Thus m medical literature one finds
arguments for aborting deformed
fetuses on the · grounds that the
costs of aborting are so much less
th~n the costs of sustaining the
c~tl~ren who would be born.' 7
Stmtlarly there are those who argue that the costs of certain kinds
of treatment, where the chances
~f recovery are statistically highly
Improbable or involve people who
are poor risks, may justify withholdmg
treatment from
such
individuals.
Formalistic modes of normative reasoning are to be distin~ished from utilitarian modes
·~ that formalists allege that the
nghtness or wrongness of actions
or practices does not depend solely ~pon their consequences. For~~hst~ .ne~d not, therefore, reject
utlhtanan reasoning but
util't
see
• y as. a~ most one right-making
~-haractensttc of actions a nd prac•ces am~ng others such as justice,
truth-telhng, gratitude, reparation
~tc. One of the most widely re~
pect~d and regnant formalist syste~ IS that of W. D . Ross .Is
. he question no doubt arises
m _the .minds of our readers at this
~dmt JUSt how it is that one deCI es .that certam
·
of
characteristics
actions are right- or wrong~aking characteristics, a nd certain
c aracteristics of things or s . I
ends a
octa
lated t~ g~. or evil. C losely reti
thts IS the further quesgron as to what individuals and
oups . speak with authority on
m
. medtcme
. . a nd what
it oral
. ISsues 10
iS that confers such authority
These are q uestwns
·
of metaethics·
August, I 97 3

to which we now turn.
Metaethical Questions for
Medicine
. There has been, and there contt~u~s to be a strong presumption
wtthm the profession of medicine
that the profession itself provides
t~e best basis for deciding what is
ngh~ and wrong in questions of
me?tca~ research and care. Medical
ethtcs 10 this view is defined, understood, and practiced by medical pr~fessionals. Among medical
professiOnals, those with a doctor's
de~ree in medicine carry the most
wet~ht. The proposition that a
particular group is best qualified
to make and to criticize moral judgments pertaining to their own interests and work is not self-evidently
~rue or false. Whether one believes
It to be true or false depends in
large measure on one's view of the
nature of moral judgments a nd moral decision-making processes.
. ~ook~ on medical ethics by spectahsts rn ethics do not uniformly
presuppose the special expertise
of the medical profession to make
moral judgments about medical
cases. Joseph F letcher in Morals
and Medicine does not presume
to be do ing medical ethics.'9
~letch_er claims that he is deallOg wtth the ethics of medical care
and th at in so doing he is not
dealing with medical ethics, a term
~sua lly used for the rules governmg the soc_ial conduct and graces
of the medtcal profession: "Medical ethics is the business of th
med'teal profession, although cer-e
ta!nl~ it has to fall somewhat
wtthiO the limits of social obli.gation." 2 ° Fletcher
recognizes
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from ethics ge.n erally is its
nthat some professionals would
cern with the moral questions at
give medical ethics as a profesarise in and from the practic of
sio nal concern a loftier definition.
He cites Dr. George Jacoby as medicine.
Thus when Paul Ramsey set ut
saying that medical ethics deals
to write a book on patient care. nwith " the question of the general
titled The Patient as Person. he
attitude of the physician toward
subtitle is "Explorations in ~ Jithe patient: to what extent his duty
cal Ethics."zz In the prefac to
obligates him to intervene in the
his book, he makes his vie• of
patient's interest, and what dethe relation between medical thmands the physician has a right
ics and ethics generally ver) ;:xand duty to make upon the patient's relatives in regard to obe- plicit:
problems of medical ethics .
dience and subordination for the
are by no means technical pr
purposes of treatment." 2 1 Fletcher
terns o n which only the expert
this case, the phys ician) can h
notes that Dr. Jacoby nowhere says
a n opinion. They are rather
~
anything about the demands the
problems of human beings in
patient has a right and duty to
ua tio ns in which ·medical car• s
make upon physicians. Fletcher
needed. Birth and· death, illness d
then claims that it is this other
injury, are not s imply events e
doctor attends. They are mom ts
perspective, namely the patient's
in every human life.
point of view, that he tries to take
. . . The question, What 0 1 tl t
in examining the morals, principles
the doctor to do? is only a pa -a nd values that are at stake in
ular form of the question, V. at
should be done?
medical care.
... I hold that medical ethi is
Despite Fletcher's distinction beconsonant with the ethics of a " er
tween an ethics of medical care
human community. The form• is
and medical ethics as professional
(however special) only a partie .ar
e thics, his own book is virtually
case of the latter. T he moral req• ·ements governing the relation of
always referred to as a book in
physician to patients and reser chmedical ethics. When . physicians
er to subjects are only a sp ·ial
speak of the book in this way,
case of the moral requirements J VI think it is because they presume
erning any relations between •tan
that the issues raised by Fletcher
and man. Canons o f loyalty II paare issues for the m as professiontients or to joint adventure. . in
medical research are simply p . ticals: nothing about medical care is
ula r manifestat ions of canons o loyoutside the expertise of the physia lty of person to pe rson genera.lyP
cian ; certainly no thing about medRamsey has the utmost , espect
ical care is outside the concern of
for the moral sensitivity of physithe physician. When ethicists refer
cians. Nevertheless, he ts not
to Fletcher's . book as a book in
sanguine that the medical profesmedical ethics, they share the assion and its codes will su!fice to
sumption that medical ethics is
contemporary
m~dicine
guide
part of ethics generally and that
what distinguishes medical ethics through its ethical dilem mas:
Linacre ()uancrlY
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In the medical literature there
are many articles on ethics which
are greatly to be admired. Yet I
kn~w that these are not part of the
dally fare of medical students, or
of members of the profession when
they gather together .as professiona~s . o~ even for purposes of ccnVtvtahty. I do not believe tha t either
the codes of medica l ethics or the
physicians who have undertaken to
comment on them a nd to give
fresh analysis of the physician's
moral decisions will suffice to withs~nd . the omnivorous appetite of
~·entlfic research or of a therapeutic technology that has a momentum
and a life of its own.
T~e Nuremberg Code, the Dec~ratton of Helsinki, various "guidehn~s"_of the American Medical AsSOCiation,
and other "codes" gove .
rnmg medical practice constitute
a sort of "catechism" in the e thics
of the medica l profession. T hese
c~es exhibit a prOfessional ethics
whtch ministers and theologians
and members of other professions
~:n _only ~rofoundl y respect and
mtre. Still, a catechism never
sufficed. Unless these principles
~re constantly pondered a nd enlivened in their application they
become dead letters. There is a lso
need tha t these principles be deepened and sensitized and opened to
~~her huma ne revision in face of
:
th~ ordinary and the newl y
mergmg situations which a doc~or confronts - as do we all tn the present day. In th is task
~ne of the sources of moral instght_, no understanding of the humanity
. of man or for a nsweri ng
q_uesttons of life and death can
rtghtfully be neglected.~4
'

calTh'rs _does not mean that medi. ethtcs is best left to those
tratned ·tn ethics
.
only. R amsey
argues
th
t
h
.
.
ical . . a p ystclans can do med·
. .ethlcs but not Without
some
tralntng tn
.
. .
et h'tcs; Similarly
ethiAugust, 197 3

cists need exposure to the fields
of medicine to which their ethical
reflections .are directed. Above all
Ramsey argues that the medicai
~rofession should no longer believe_ t_hat the personal integrity of
physicians alone is enough " t
with the contemporary
danes of medical ethics."zs
Whereas Ramsey does not become
explici~ .about the metaethical presuppositions that inform his view
a recent essay by Robert Veatch
doe~.z6 This essay argues on theoretical grounds that medical ethics
~ hould not be the province of med~ca l practitioners only and that medICal decisions cannot be morally
justified if they are construed as
matters of personal opinion. The
fact that these decisions of medical
care are made by physicians does
not by itself suffice to raise them
above ~he level of personal opinion.
In dlscus~ing the relationship between medtcal ethics and ethics
generally, Veatch describes a common debate that occurs between
those trai ned in medicine and those
who are not. Veatch cites a case
where a woman was diagnosed to
be dying from cancer. The medical
student who presents the case considers it appropriate to tell the
woman gently and diplomatically
that although the medical staff will
~o all_that it can to treat her conditiOn, It cannot give her assurances
that she will recover. The physi c~an who is the student's super~~s_or ~nd _the other physicians partlctpatmg m the discussion to which
Veatch alludes claimed that as
physicians they have a unique ethical duty to do no harm to the pa-

dea~

quan~

19 1

ethical theory that the peculi; ty
tient. The physicians were i_n agree- of moral assertions is prect ly
ment that telling the patient she that they are assertions that c m
has cancer will harm her and ther~ to be universalizable.28 In ~ er
fore it is wrong to tell her thiS. words the decision not to tel he
Non-physicians discussing_ t_his case truth ~o a dying patient is one .at
disagreed with the physlcl~ns re- one would expect any right~tl kgarding the factual questwn of ing person to make if o~e m let
whether the bad news about can- claims that this is the nght
cicer would adversely affect the
sion in cases of this sort: .
patient and also as to whether the
Personal RelatiVISm ·
decision ought finally to be ba~ed
The difficulties of relati ;tic
on the principle of not har~mg theories of ethics cannot be oror on the principle of ~th-telhng. oughly discussed here ~ut have ;en
What raises the metaethlcal ques- elsewhere.29 There IS, hov Jer,
tion here is the claim of th~ phy- another point at issue tha desicians that their understa~dm~ of serves some elaboration.
!ere
moral norms or principles IS umque are those among physicians and
to the medical profession and should this view seems .to be quite ombe given priority in medical cases moo who assume that mor deover the judgments of non-profes- cisi;ns are personal decision and
sionals.
. that physicians can do_ no f\ore
Veatch argues that these physi- than other human bemgs :hen
cians were actually claiming th~t faced with moral dilemmas,_ hich
there are specific moral rules appl_l- is to search diligently thei own
ble in medicine which are vahd consciences. This presumpt n is
ca
. .
d
for physicians qua physiCians, an
also a metaethical positic for
that the general rules and expect~ which the medical literatun gives
tions of the larger society may, m no justification. With respect 1 this
specific cases, be justifiably abro- form of relativism, ethical Ieory
gated by them. As Veatch notes, is more divided, but at thl same
this is an implicit acceptance. ~f a time strong objectwns
·
to
and
particular . metaethical pos~tl~n,
hard
lausible alternatives are m
namely that of social relatiVISm P
to find.3o It is enough ..,or o purwhich argues that to say of a~ ac- poses here simply to indic. ; that
tion that it is right or wron~ IS to one of the working assumpt ms of
at it is in accord With the
. .
.
t < le for
say th
h . some physicians
IS no
. at
mores of one's group. Veatc ~s which they have offered ltiOn
quite right in asserting that this and cogent arguments. Wh ,-e o~e
metaethical position is not one stands with respect to sueI an ISthat ethicists would defendP It sue makes a lot of differ<: lee for
is a meaningful question to _ask one's conception of the n;,wre of
whether anything considered nght medicine as a science
.
anl as an
.
·
that
or wrong by one's group is in fact art. It goes w1thout
sayi ng ..
right or wrong. Indeed, it is a grow- those who implicitly or explicitlY
ing consensus in contemporary
Linacre QuarterlY
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adhere to doctrines of social or
personal relativism in ethics can
more easily justify the private and/
or professional ·nature of medical
ethics, feeling no intellectual or
moral obligation to know what is
discovered by professional ethicists
or even what is thought to be right
or wrong by the general public except insofar as opinions of the
public may represent political and/or
legal power to influence decisions
by medical practitioners.
There is another important implication of metaethical theories like
social and personal relativism. If
one is a social relativist, there is
no way to decide who among differing groups should have the say regarding questions of right or wrong.
Personal relativism is also ultimately ~ithout a basis. for adjudicating
disputes among groups or persons.
In practice, relativists tend to give
the nod in moral decisions to the
persons who have the most expertise regarding the factual data relevant to the decisions being made.
This means that where the doctors
of medicine are considered the experts par excellence in matters of
health, they are granted the ultimate power of moral decisionmaking in medical cases. Veatch
refers to this as the fallacy of generalization of expertise. It is a fallacy because, as Veatch and other
ethicists generally hold, moral
decisions are not based only upon
factual matters narrowly defined.
Furthermore, the same facts are
~n differently from the perspective Qf various disciplines.
The value of truth for a dying
patient may quite justifiably be
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perceived quite differently by
someone like a minister who may
well consider it a great benefit for
all concerned if dying persons face
the question of their own dying.
This kind of benefit may or may
not be accepted on purely medical
grounds depending upon one's
conception of health and of medicine as well as one's conception
of the relation between bodily and
psychic functions. In any event,
the judgment as to whether one
ought to reflect upon one's dying is
not self-evidently a strictly medical
decision, even if the term health
is stretched to cover every aspect
of a person's well-being. Health so
defined becomes the concern of
everyone, including a great variety
of professionals in addition to those
trained in medicine.
Albeit in a very preliminary way,
our discussion of metaethical assumptions illustrates some of the
ways in which metaethical theories,
whether held implicitly or explicitly,
influence very practical or strategic
questions of moral policy, such as
who will be accorded the authority
and power to decide moral issues
in medical care and how the decisions made will be implemented.
In short, metaethical theories have
great practical import for moral
strategy or policy. This is so because metaethical theory is a theory about the nature of the processes of moral decision-making,
particularly of the kind of justification that one offers for one's
moral judgments. Metaethics seeks
to assess the extent to which such
justifications are rational or irrational, subjective or objective, and
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private or universalizable. Let us sons.3t An example of a q stlook at some of the practical moral theological assumption that gr tly
problems of medical decision-mak- influences policy would be tat
ing and raise some questions about persons are very prone to evil. nd
these in the light of certain meta- hence Jaws and sanctions are ;ry
important for preventing evt as
ethical criteria.
compared with an assumption 1at
people are prone to do what is od
Questions of Moral Policy
and interference in their fre Jm
for Medicine
Moral policy refers to that por- tends to be more harmful than . letion of the total ethical enterprise ficial. Some of the disputes a1 mg
in which whatever is known or be- physicians about the regulati< of
lieved to be true in normative the- research often reflect a diffe nee
ory as well as metaethical theory of opinion as to whether in<. •idis applied to specific moral issues uals doing research are more 1 one
and the methods used to cope with to be influenced by desire~ for
tme
them. Decisions about what is right money, advancement, and
or
by
the
desire
to
know
the
uth
or wrong, good or bad, are not soleand
benefit
humanity.
Obv:
tsly
ly decided, nor ought they to be, on
the
direction
of
one's
thinking
1
out
the basis of ethical theory per se.
policy
can
be
tipped
in
one
'
recEthical theory provides one of the
essential components of any ade- tion or another by such cons eraquate moral decision, namely a meth- tions.
Wielding power in dec ionod of moral reasoning.
making
depends a great dea upMoral reasoning about specific
on
who
has the facts that ar- relmoral issues, such as whether to do
evant
to
what is being de< Jed.
or to have an abortion, a sterilizaPhysicians
have a great deal ol >OWtion, a kidney transplant, etc. has
er
in
medical
cases by reas .1 of
two components: reasoning about
their
express
certification
to 1ake
general principles as illustrated by
diagnoses
and
engage
in
int
venour discussion of the difference betion
where
assistance
in
matt
rs
of
tween formalists and utilitarians;
health
is
being
sought
and
b
reareasoning as to the best processes
by which to arrive at a decision. Pol- son of the general respect ace )rded
icy debates, however, hinge not only this certification by the pubL.· and
on the nature of one's moral reason- by other professionals conLa n_ed
ing but on the perception one has with health and illness, such as mmof relevant facts, the kinds of loyal- isters, lawyers, judges, polit.cians,
ties one has, such as loyalties to etc. It is also important to note that
one's family, . one's ethnic group, there are a whole range of ()(;cupaone's profession, one's religion, one's tional roles other than that of the
nation, etc., and also one's more physician involved in medical car~.
theological or quasi-theological as- These persons, such as nurses, physisumptions about the nature of real- otherapists, counselors, voluntarY
ity, particularly the nature of per- aides, etc., tend to have a definiteLinacre QuarterlY
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ly subordinate role in medical decision-making wherever these persons Jack an M.D.
There are two strategies, therefore, that serve to secure the power
of the licensed physician to have
the final say in matters of medical
care: one is to perpetuate the notion that the proper knowledge of
medicine is conferred by those institutions accredited to grant the
M.D. degree; the other is to keep
the precious knowledge possessed
by the holder of the M.D. within
the confines of that profession and
to share it as little as possible with
any other professional or with the
patient.
Sharing of Power
Now we are not arguing that the
power and role of expert knowledge per se be diminished or denigrated. The question before us is
rather the extent to which the power that comes from possessing such
knowledge should be shared and to
what extent.
Consider the following case: a
man is seriously ill, so ill that there
is. a high probability that he may
dte.sz The physician does not convey this to the patient nor does
he inform the man's minister of
this diagnosis. A nurse, however,
connected with the case takes it
upon herself to tell the man's minister before he sees the patient of
~recisely how serious the man's
illness ·ts JUdged
·
to be. The ministe~, with some trepidation, but
With firm resolve, decides to share
this information with the patient.
When this incident was reported
to a class of graduate students in
rei'tgton,
.
some of whom were trainAuaust, 1973

ing for the mmtstry and some of
whom were obtaining higher degrees specializing in ethics, there
was considerable criticism of the
minister's action. Many felt that
the minister should not have taken
this upon himself without consulting with the doctor. Indeed some
felt strongly that the minister must
have the attending physician's consent to talk to the patient about
dying. The minister in this instance
disagreed sharply. He viewed the
man who was in danger of dying
as one who was not only paying
the physician to carry out whatever
duties were incumbent upon him
as a physician, but as one who was
also paying the minister to carry out
his duties. The question as to whether a person who may be dying should
reflect upon this possibility or actuality as the case may be is as much
a question of the welfare of the patient as the question as to whether
discussions of dying will have an
adverse physical effect upon a patient. The difficult question as to
whether in fact a particular patient
will have adverse physical reactions to the topic of death - it
appears that this is much less often
the case than is supposed - is not
the critical question if one's concern about the patient is for that
patient's total welfare. A lawyer
or a friend or a relative concerned
about whether a proper will has
been made out, a minister concerned about whether persons have
achieved a proper attitude toward
their own limited powers as human
beings, a nurse concerned with the
anxieties of patients who want to
'know, all raise important considera-
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quires consent · and the neces y
tions about what is beneficial for for consent is only waived in
patients. If physicians are the only tre me emergency to save · I ·s
ones who know that a given per- where it is not possible to ob n
son is dying, the power of what is consent in the time required. I rbest for the patient in the light of thermore, as indicated in- the ; •that fact resides totally with him cles of the Nuremberg tribu tl,
or with her. Is this the way it ought any procedure considered to >e
to be?
experimental is acknowledgec as
One immediate reaction to this requiring informed and volur ry
question is that it depends upon consent of the patient or sot ::\.
the particular case that one has in Although this requirement is s• temind. But that response misses the times violated in spirit oc .quit itpoint of the question, which is the erally, nevertheless these viola ms
question as to whether it is best are considered deviations fron acfor attending physicians to make cepted norms of medical pra ice
the decision that they indeed will and are subject to censure and egbe the only ones who know the ative sanctions. Nevertheless,
is
prognosis of patients. It is of course still the case that .physicians h :ely
the case that many physicians, wheth- control, on an individual an< ;oler for moral reasons or for others, lective basis, what informati · is
will share their knowledge of the conveyed to patients. They als< ·onprognosis of a patient, sometimes trot, for the most part, what foronly with persons responsible for mation is conveyed to all
ners
the care of that patient, sometimes concerned with the welfat of
with those persons as well as with
relatives and friends of patients, patients.
Now this situation may b seen
and sometimes with all of these to be less than optimum in ,. least
and patients as well. The question two major ways. First of a the
is what persons should be involved
knowledge possessed by phy cians
in the decision about who shares
by reason of their training ' imin this knowledge?
portant to know if the P· ient's
Information Controlled
welfare is to be served, bt it is
The principle that some knowl- not the only knowledge that ;s reledge must be shared with patients evant to the welfare of p tients.
is well established. We are not Secondly, moral decision- taking
therefore talking about totally involves a process that i1eludes
withholding information from pa- knowledge of factual info• nation
tients or from other persons con- as one of its important comr Jnents,
cerned with patients' care and well- but not as its only componc;lt. The
being. Patients, or those who are first point involves many intaesting
spokesmen for patients, sign con- questions that we do not ha>c space
sent forms that include some details to discuss here: questions about con·
about medical interventions that ceptions of health and disease, and
are being contemplated. Surgical conceptions of what various kinds
interference, for example, reLinacrc Quarterly
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of expertise contribute to the enhancement
of health • the d'lmtnU.
.
tiOn
of
disease
and
the
.
•
mcrease
. . . .
m.mdlVldual and community wellbemg. The role and scope of con· ·m
. enhancing
temporary med'•cme
human well-being is not self-evident
~me of its benefits to those whos~
hves have b~en s~ved and lengthened are fauly mdisputable b t
contemporary medicine with i~
armament of powerful drugs its
quest for new knowledge thr~ h
using humans, does
a ways engage in practices that are
non-controversially beneficial.
!he second point is one that requl~_es some comment. As we noted
ear .'~r, the components of moral
dectslon-making
and the nature of
.
th ts process IS
· what a metaeth' I
theory · d .
1ca
Des . ts e~tgned to elucidate.
ptte certam variations am
. there is a growong
theorists ·m detatl,
in
m! co?sensus in contemporary
m taethtcal theory that moral judgth:tsthare rational to the degree
. ey are factually informed
rei. al!vely d'tsmterested
·
relatively•
d tspassionate
d
'
.
of a v· . . ' an made m the light
othe tvad amagination as to how
or ~ ru:e affe~ted by the action
p acl!ce be10g decided 33 Th
power d
·
e
tio
an role of factual informawe
hav
1
n
Th
e a ready illustrated
decC:t·oother _components of morai
· some clarificatio n·mak10g ment
interes~~The best examples of disness
ness and dispassionate· t he procedures
USed are
t found 10
J. ud'tcta
· 1 processes
o
govern
in th
Th
.
e
courtroo
Would
m.
us JUdges
not
be
s
their
. een as fit to try
nor 'fOWn chaldren or 1oved ones
t they owned stock .m a com-'

r~search
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~~t

pany, to judge an alleged wrongdoing of that company. We have
c~me, albeit belatedly, to recogn_tze .some of the subtleties of ractal mterest, if not prejudice and
we ac~ accordingly to see ' that
bl_ack JUrors are involved in the
tn.als of blacks. In a perfect world
thts would not in princi pie be necessary but that is not the kind of
w?rld that we live in, certainly not
wath respect to the way our judgments are influenced by our mter.
ests and our passions.34
Experiments
.Th~ physician-patient relationship . ts ~reatly simplified if the
relatiOnshtp
is purely between
h . .
ystct~ns
who
are committed to
P
con str~mt from doing any harm
to pattents and to employing only
those thera peu t'tc
.
mterventions
~hat can reasonably be expected to
Improve
the conditions of patents.
t'
H
owever, many physicians are part
of the ceaseless quest of mod
d' .
ern
me . tcme for knowledge so that
~attents ~an also become subjects
10 expenments and as such rna
find
at the receiving
~f nsk-filled
interventions that
. ave a low, or even no, probabiltty of benefiting them.
Physicians who also see th · ·
selves
as scientists
.
cannot em
be
vtewed as disinterested parties in
t~e care and welfare of their pattents. Because of the great power
tha~ physicians have by reason of
thet~ knowledge, the requirement
of tnformed consent where the
knowledge of the procedures are
conveyed by the scientist-physician
~ardly guarantees that disinterested
JUdgments as to what are justified

t~emselves

en~
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risks will be made. This is one of to be disinterested or dispa onthe reasons why procedures for ate about. By the same token hyachieving more disinterestedness sicians can rightly claim th< unin decisions involving experimen- informed lay persons may ave
by
tation have been set up by agencies their views of this distorh
35
their
passions
and
interests
f
he
such as the FDA and NIH . Inwhole
purpose
of
democrati1
'
rocreasingly these agencies are also
recognizing that the committees cesses from a moral point o iew
that are to review research before is to achieve a higher meas• ; of
dispassi ateit will be funded by government disinterestedness,
ness,
and
vivid
imagination
c 1ow
money should include non-scienvarious
parties
are
affected
i one
tists and non-physicians who will
policy
or
another.
To
acco
Jlish
help to represent interests that are
this,
democratic
processes
s1
-:
to
not primarily those of a medical
maximize
participation
of
(
erse
scientist or even a physician. Such
persons may take a harder look at interests, or at least to achie\ repthe scientific merit of proposed resentation of those diverse Jter.experiments, but equally if not ests and to establish proc ures
more important is their role in by which persons and grou are
articulating the point of view and guaranteed due process .
Here we touch on one
the
interests of those who are potential
critical
strategic
moral
iss•
s
in
subjects in any experiment.
contemporary
medicine.
T.l
reIncreasing the representation of
interests that are non-medical and lations between physicians a I panon-research oriented not only tients are not governed put y by
of
serves to protect individuals but the moral conscientiousnc
physicians
and
the
sophist
ation
also serves to determine whether
or not certain kinds of medical in- of patients. Groups like thl poor
terventions will create desirable and blacks suffer ill health 1 part
or undesirable social policies. To because, for various reason they
take one extreme example, deci- either do not avail themse es of
sions to und·ertake experiments to existing medical care for which
perfect the technique of in-vitro they are eligible, or when t ey ~o
fertilization, that is of creating and so, they encounter difficult .:s tn·
sustaining human life outside the tentionally or unintentional . per·
womb, may well be motivated by petrated by persons and modes
the physicians' desire to provide of care that are not well under·
children for couples who would stood or appreciated, and which
otherwise be childless. However, may or may not be best fm them.
these experiments and their re- Again, this situation is o nly ~ar·
sults, while hypothetically bene- tially rectified by injecting tnto
ficial on an individual basis, may the delivery of medical care ~r
not represent a sound social policy. sons from ethnic and/or minonty
The question of regulation is not groups that are not now wd l rep·
one that physicians can be expected resented. There are also larger
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policy questions having to do
with health education, with alleviation of poverty, with the location and nature of health facilities, and also with the locus and
nature of the administrative control of these facilities.
Clearly, our brief essay could
only encompass a framework for
discussion. There are so many
questions that require substantive
analysis. Our failure to take up
some of these questions in greater detail is not due to a Jack o f
desire but rather to a self-confessed
choice that it was important to put
some of these questions into a
larger framework, a framework
suggested by the nature and scope
of the ethical enterprise itself.
There is no question that the assumption throughout has been
that the concerns of the medical
profession and of medical ethics
as an enterprise are very much the
concern of everyone but particularly of ethicists who reflect on the
most general nature of ethics and
moral decision-making. In no way
do we wish to minimize thereby the
significance and the benefits of the
expertise that comes to us from
medicine. We have only suggested
~ays of thinking and of formulatIng policy that may increase these
benefits for all concerned.
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Doctors Ezzo and Barker describe the health program for religious that has been in operation
for several years in . the St. Petersburg, Fla. , Diocese. The article offers a blueprint to diocesan officials
and doctors in other parts of the
country who are concerned about
the health care of religious personnel in their areas.
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The St. Petersburg
Diocesan Health Program

udgs of
are
pol-

must
at is
dis-

Joseph A. Ezzo, M.D. and
Arthur J . Barker, M.D.

In an effort to render our priests
and sisters better health services,
Catholic guilds in some areas have
instituted programs for periodic
physical examinations and foll owup care. Programs vary from mass
screening to intensive, individual
diagnostic surveys, but few of these
attempts have been successful. We
believe the program that started
in 1968 in the St. Petersburg, Fla.,
Diocese is meeting with reasonable
success and we are outlining it in
The Linacre Quarterly as a guide
for other guilds.
The objectives of our program :
I. To get a comprehensive history and physical examination documented on all religious in the dio-

cese.

2. To establish doctor-patient
relationships with all of them.
3. To detect asymptomatic disease and advise therapy as indi -

cated.
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Both authors are in private practice in St. Petersburg: Dr. Ezzo in
internal medicine and cardiology,
Dr. Barker as a surgeon. Among
other honors, Dr. Ezzo is a Diplomate of the American Board of
Internal Medicine and a Fellow
of the American College of Physicians, and Dr. Barker is a Diplomate of th e American Board of
Surgery.
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4 . To orient the religious to
their health needs.
Health Kit
To do this, a " health kit" has
been produced and distributed to
every priest and sister in the diocese. It contains three essential
components:
I. An explanatory letter of direction. Essentially this explains
the program and asks the examinee
to fill out the enclosed health questionnaire; to make an appointment
with the physician of his or her
choice in the month of birth ; to
bring a urine specimen (cleancatch, first-voided morning specimen) and to report to the doctor's
office in a fasting state.
2. T he health questionnaire.
This is a comprehensive 12-page
questionnaire (similar to the Cornell Medical Index) that seems
best sui ted to our purposes. "Confidential" is printed in large let-
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